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When the expansion o f cities is constrained either by natural barriers, such as 
New Orleans, or by policy efforts to limit urban sprawl, development pressures 
in hazardous areas can markedly increase. As floodplains, steep slopes, earth­
quake fault zones, and other hazardous locations are converted to urban uses, 
the locality’s vulnerability to hazard events increases as does the potential for 
serious losses o f lives and property in natural disasters. The devastation of 
New Orleans from Hurricane Katrina is an extreme example o f the phenome­
non. But this threat can be neutralized if  hazards are recognized in advance 
of exposure and appropriate counter-measures are adopted. The difficulty is 
that in the absence o f state planning and hazard mitigation requirements, 
many localities ignore hazards in planning for and regulating urban develop­
ment, as shown most recently by Steinberg and Burby (2002).
New Orleans and Miami, Florida, provide excellent examples to evaluate 
the effects o f adequate planning and preparation for cities in hazardous areas. 
New Orleans provides an example o f what can occur in a city with severe 
constraints on buildable land and a lack o f adequate public concern for hazards 
or urban development planning. In contrast, decisions made by policy makers 
in the State o f Florida and by the Miami-Dade County Government illustrate 
how concern for hazard avoidance and resource protection can lead to policies 
that sharply limit development in flood-prone areas. To see if  lessons revealed 
by these two cases could be replicated nationwide, we examine natural disas­
ters and associated property damages in samples o f metropolitan counties with 
varying degrees o f containment brought about by policy decisions or natural 
conditions and with varying degrees o f planning. And our findings are ex­
tremely telling. Metropolitan counties with either natural or policy contain­
ment experienced higher property losses in disasters when states left planning 
and development decisions wholly to local government discretion. Where 
states intervened and demanded that localities plan and manage development 
with hazard mitigation in mind, property losses are strikingly lower.
These findings are significant for several reasons. Urban containment 
programs are proliferating throughout the United States as governments at­
tempt to counter various adverse effects o f urban sprawl (Nelson and Dawkins 
2004). Yet with the exception o f our earlier work on containment and hazards 
(Burby et al. 2001), planning literature makes virtually no mention o f the 
potential for containment programs to foster unsafe development patterns. In 
fact, a recent paper published by the Brookings Institution (Pendall et al. 
2002) enumerates a number o f issues related to containment that the authors 
believe require the attention o f planning scholars, but they make no mention 
o f the potential for larger losses in disasters. This is a serious oversight. Natu­
ral hazards on average result in economic losses o f approximately $26 billion 
per year in the United States (Mileti 1999), and, rather than decreasing, losses 
are increasing as urban development continues unabated in areas at risk (Cohn 
et al. 2001; Cutter 2001; Mileti 1999).
Beginning with a description o f urban containment programs and noting 
their increasing use in urban areas o f the United States, this essay then ex­
plains the rationale for our hypotheses that containment, either by natural 
features or by sprawl-busting public policy, may accelerate development in 
hazardous areas and why state planning mandates may provide an antidote to 
this peril. This is followed by a discussion o f the methods we employed to 
test these propositions and their limitations. The research findings follow in 
two stages. An examination o f the experience o f New Orleans shows that as 
the growth o f the city came face to face with natural constraints, it chose to 
allow development in its very hazardous backswamps. The result, obviously, 
was quite poor. We contrast this with the growth o f Miami and Dade County, 
where policy makers in the 1970s decided to limit the expansion o f the city 
into low-lying hazardous areas by enacting an urban growth boundary. Fol­
lowing these case studies, we examine the magnitude o f property losses in 
natural disasters in U.S. counties that have various degrees o f natural contain­
ment and that have and have not adopted urban containment policies. This 
essay concludes with a discussion o f the implications o f our findings for state 
and local efforts to manage urban growth, and for federal disaster policy.
U r b a n  C o n t a i n m e n t
Unbounded urban growth is constrained in many places by various natural 
features that limit or channel urban development. Typically, urban develop­
ment in these cities occurs at fairly high densities, reflecting limits on the land 
supply. For example, urban expansion in Los Angeles, considered by some to 
be an exemplar o f urban sprawl, is constrained by the Pacific Ocean to the 
west and mountains to the east. Surprising to some, at more than 7,000 people 
per square mile, densities in Los Angeles are higher than in most U.S. metro­
politan areas. Other U.S. cities with a high degree o f natural containment and
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relatively high densities include Miami, New Orleans, New York City, San 
Diego, and San Francisco.
Community efforts to contain urban development within legislatively 
prescribed boundaries trace their roots to the origins o f urbanization, as 
human settlements used walls to provide protection from hostile neighbors 
and gates to control entry and exit. Medieval walled cities continued this 
practice, and it persisted even after the creation o f modern nation states. In 
England in 1580, Queen Elizabeth I forbade building within three miles of 
London to limit the spread o f plague and protect farmland from urban en­
croachment (Easley 1992). European efforts to contain urban sprawl have con­
tinued ever since.
The idea o f containing urban expansion originated in the United States 
in the early years o f the twentieth century (Scott 1969), and it was vigorously 
argued for by Lewis Mumford and other urbanists in the years before World 
War II (Daniels 1999). The first formal urban growth boundary in the U.S., 
however, was not adopted until 1958, when Lexington, Kentucky, put in place 
policies to limit urban development to a core area o f 67 square miles. The goal 
was to protect blue grass farms and horse breeding operations from urban 
intrusions (Porter 1997). Outside the boundary, residential density was limited 
to one dwelling unit per ten acres. Three years later, in 1961, the State of 
Hawaii created the Hawaii State Land Use Commission to zone all land in 
the state into three classifications: urban, agricultural, and conservation (Healy 
1976). The state’s primary goals were to curb urban sprawl and protect land 
for agricultural production (De Grove 1983).
During the 1970s, other states and cities began to initiate urban contain­
ment programs. Oregon’s Land Conservation and Development Act (1973) 
requires urban growth boundaries for incorporated cities and urban areas of 
counties and restricts the use o f land outside the boundaries to rural activities 
(Leonard 1983). In 1975, Dade County, Florida, implemented a containment 
program by enacting a growth boundary (Freilich 1999). That same year, Sara­
sota County, Florida, adopted a boundary plan with three tiers for develop­
ment: urban, semi-rural, and rural (Freilich 1999).1
U r b a n  C o n t a i n m e n t  a n d  E x p o s u r e  t o  H a z a r d s
As urban containment programs limit land available for development, one of 
their first effects is usually an increase in land values (Hall et al. 1973; White- 
law 1980). This initially leads developers to use land more efficiently, building 
housing and other projects at higher densities than before (Landis 1986; Howe 
1993; Nelson 2000). Another potential effect is pressure to develop land ex­
posed to natural hazards that prior to the containment program developers 
avoided when looking for sites for residential and nonresidential projects. This
occurs for several reasons. First, as vacant land for development begins to 
become scarce, hazardous land may be some o f the only vacant property 
readily available. Second, because development constraints such as hazards 
should have been capitalized into land values, hazardous land may be the 
lowest price land available, all other factors being equal. I f  developers invest 
in measures to reduce the risk o f hazards, such as elevation o f roads in flood­
plains, construction and maintenance o f flood control works, installation o f 
slope-stabilization measures on hillsides, and strengthening o f infrastructure 
system components, vulnerability to damage from natural hazards may remain 
relatively constant. However, i f  local governments have inadequate develop­
ment and infrastructure design regulations in place or regulations are inade­
quately enforced, which is not uncommon, losses in hazard events should 
escalate.
There are a number o f steps local governments can take to counter the 
potential effects o f containment programs on the vulnerability o f development 
to damage in disasters: (i) preventive policies and actions, such as conservation 
zoning, to limit the exposure o f new development to losses from hazards; (2) 
property protection policies and actions, such as building standards and assis­
tance to property owners to retrofit buildings to increase their resilience to 
hazards; (3) structural protection policies and actions such as flood control 
works to provide areawide protection from hazards; (4) emergency services poli­
cies and actions to lessen the impact o f a hazard after its onset; and (5) infor­
mation programs to build awareness o f hazards and knowledge o f actions that 
can be taken to reduce the risk o f loss (Burby et al. 2001). The problem is 
hazard mitigation tends to be a very low priority for local governments as 
revealed by numerous studies (Rossi et al. 1982; Burby and M ay 1998; and 
Burby 2006). In fact, Burby et al. (1997) found that local governments are not 
likely to pursue such measures vigorously without being forced to do so 
through mandates imposed by state governments.
Containment o f urban growth, in sum, either by natural topographic and 
hydrologic features or through conscious public policy, will lead to increased 
development o f hazardous areas and increased losses in natural disasters. This 
effect can be countered if  states require that local governments pay attention 
to hazard mitigation in planning for and managing urban growth. These ex­
pectations are illustrated in Table 1.
I n v e s t i g a t i n g  t h e  E f f e c t s  o f  C o n t a i n m e n t
Increased vulnerability to natural hazards should manifest itself first through 
changes in the value o f land in hazardous areas and then in the likelihood and 
intensity o f development o f those areas. In the face o f a hazard event, this 
in turn result in higher losses in the contained jurisdiction than would
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have occurred if urban expansion had not been contained by natural features 
or by policy makers through enactment of an urban containment program. In 
the research undertaken for this essay, we focus on the association of contain­
ment programs and property damages experienced in natural disasters.
O ur case studies of M iami/Dade County and New Orleans are based on 
secondary data sources that include, among others, historical treatments of 
the development of New Orleans and Miami, government documents detail­
ing efforts to plan for and manage urban development and mitigate flood 
and hurricane threats, insurance claims data assembled by the National Flood 
Insurance Program and the Institute for Business and Home Safety, and 
newspaper accounts of various events related to the vulnerability of the cities 
to disasters. Our accounts of development and hazard mitigation decision 
making were shared with various experts to help avoid errors in our descrip­
tions of events and in our interpretations of them.
Our national cross-sectional data come from a number of sources as well. 
The Institute for Business and Home Safety (IBH S) provided data on prop­
erty losses in natural disasters. The data were developed by IB H S from loss 
claims data provided by member insurance companies for claims stemming 
from natural disasters during the period January 1, 1994, through December 
31, 2000. Member company claims data represent a significant portion, but 
not all, o f the losses by insurance companies that paid claims for disaster 
events during this period. IB H S expanded these losses to develop estimates 
o f total insured losses paid (in constant 2000 dollars) using data on the market 
share o f the member insurance companies. The loss data exclude two signifi­
cant sources o f losses: earthquake losses to residential and commercial prop­
erty and flood losses to residential property. We excluded earthquake losses 
because they are concentrated narrowly in a few states (principally California 
due to the Northridge earthquake in 1994). Flood losses to residential property 
are excluded because for the most part these are handled by the National 
Flood Insurance Program rather than private insurers.
The degree o f natural containment was measured for a random sample 
of metropolitan counties as the sum of the lengths o f the natural containment 
boundaries o f each county divided by this sum plus the length o f the county
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boundaries less the length o f any o f the county boundaries that are coincident 
with natural containment boundaries. The natural containment boundaries 
we measured include lakes, rivers, mountains, and ocean and Great Lakes 
coastlines. The degree o f policy containment was measured using data ob­
tained from surveys o f local government growth management policies con­
ducted by Nelson and Dawkins (1999) and Pendall et al. (2001). Based on the 
enumeration o f places with containment policies from those sources, Nelson 
and Dawkins (2004) collected 100 local plans to verify that, in fact, the juris­
dictions had developed policies to contain urban growth. They found that the 
most widely used approaches to containment were the adoption of formal 
boundaries to physically constrain urban expansion, followed by use o f urban 
service extension boundaries and various growth phasing policies. Because it 
takes some time for growth management policies to translate into significant 
effects on urban development patterns, we limited our study to the sixty- 
eight counties in which containment policies were adopted in 1990 or earlier. 
Counties were counted as having containment policies in effect i f  containment 
programs were adopted at the regional level (such as Portland and Twin Cities 
metropolitan areas), county level (such as Dade County), or by one or more 
cities within the county (such as Eau Claire, Wisconsin). In many cases, city 
and county governments jointly pursued containment programs (such as San 
Diego and San Diego County). Because o f the small number o f places with 
policy containment, we adopted a simple 1 (containment exists) / (contain­
ment does not exist) coding scheme, although we recognize that there are a 
number o f ways in which containment manifests itself that may influence the 
effects o f these programs on urban development patterns.
Data on state planning mandates and state hazard mitigation policy were 
provided to us by the Institute for Business and Home Safety, which con­
tracted in 2002 with the American Planning Association (APA) to survey 
state planning legislation related to local planning and hazard mitigation. 
These data include information on whether the state requires cities and coun­
ties to develop comprehensive plans and whether the state requires that local 
plans include hazard mitigation elements. The data developed by A P A  re­
vealed that twenty-four states require all or some counties to prepare compre­
hensive plans and ten states require that these plans attend to hazards. We 
used a simple coding scheme to reflect the existence o f these state mandates, 
coding these variables 1 in counties in states with the mandates and o for 
counties in states without the mandates.2
C o n t r a s t i n g  C h o i c e s  M a d e  b y  N e w  O r l e a n s  a n d  M i a m i /  
D a d e  C o u n t y
• -i ^ ^ eans an<^  Miami provide a sharp contrast in how urban areas with 
sim ar egrees o f natural containment confront natural hazards and plan for
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and manage development. Historically, urban expansion in New Orleans has 
been constrained by wetlands and Lake Pontchartrain to the north o f the 
initially settled area along the Mississippi River, the Mississippi River to the 
south and beyond that additional wetlands, Jefferson Parish to the west, and 
wetlands and Lake Borgne to the east. Historically, urban expansion in Miami 
has been constrained by Biscayne Bay to the east and the Everglades to the 
west and south; in fact, 45% o f the county is designated as wetland and 56% is 
located in regulatory floodplains. Because o f their coastal locations and exten­
sive areas o f low-lying wetlands, both areas are highly vulnerable to natural 
hazards. Over the past 135 years, New Orleans experienced 36 hurricanes that 
struck or came with sixty miles o f the city (a recurrence interval o f 1 every 3.8 
years); Miami experienced 50 hurricanes over the same period (a recurrence 
interval o f 1 every 2.7 years).3
Prior to 1965 the development history o f both o f these areas was also 
similar in many respects. Faced with hostile natural environments, state offi­
cials, city leaders, and developers strove to create urban development opportu­
nities by draining and filling wetlands, which resulted in severe vulnerability 
to flooding as the drained land subsided, often to levels well below sea level.
After 1965, their paths diverged. Urban growth in New Orleans exploded 
into the swamps o f eastern New Orleans to take advantage o f development 
opportunities created by the construction o f Interstate Highway 10 and the 
concurrent efforts o f the U.S. Army Corps o f Engineers to enhance hurricane 
storm surge protection by extending levees to the east o f the Industrial Canal. 
In doing this, it continued a century-long process o f accommodating popula­
tion pressures by draining wetlands. In contrast, after 1965, the Florida state 
government intervened with a series o f laws that sought to strengthen local 
governments’ ability to plan for and manage urban development and to protect 
wetlands and other flood hazard areas.
The effect o f natural containment on development in New Orleans 
began to be felt toward the end o f the nineteenth century. Lewis (2003, 20) 
notes that the city was “shoehorned into a very constricted site,” but neverthe­
less initially capitalized on the natural levees o f the Mississippi River and two 
abandoned distributaries o f the river (Bayou Metairie and Bayou Gentilly) as 
sites for urban expansion. “The hideous alternative,” he notes, “was to build 
in the backswamp: the low, perennially flooded area back from the river a mile 
or two— during most o f the city’s history a pestilential morass . . . the soil 
being a black slimy material that varies in consistency between thin soup and 
dense glue” (Lewis 2003, 27). By the turn o f the century, however, land on the 
relatively flood-free natural levees had been built out, and the city began to 
expand into the backswamps. This became feasible with the invention o f the 
Wood pump by New Orleans city engineer A . Baldwin Wood. Wood’s inven­
tion made it possible to remove large amounts o f swamp water very quickly,
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so that the backswamps could be drained effectively and provide sites for new 
housing. In rapid order, New Orleans developed steadily to the north toward 
Lake Pontchartrain through a succession o f wetland drainage projects, pump­
ing and storm water drainage improvements to remove runoff from periodic 
rainstorms, and levee building to keep out storm surges from lakes Pontchar­
train and Borgne. These efforts were capped in the 1920s, when the Louisiana 
legislature authorized the Orleans Levy Board to create a 5.5 mile stepped 
levee, not along the shoreline o f Lake Pontchartrain but 3,000 feet out into 
the lake, and to reclaim the land between the new levee and old lake shoreline 
for a series o f new residential subdivisions (and later a branch o f the state 
university and modern airport).
By the 1950s, urban development occupied most o f the land between the 
new lakefront levees and older parts o f the city. Suburban sprawl was well 
underway in adjoining Jefferson Parish to the west. To compete with its 
neighbor, New Orleans looked to the swamps and already drained swamps of 
eastern New Orleans as the next site for urban expansion.
Three developments, each aided by the federal government, made this 
financially feasible. First, the passage o f the Interstate Highway Act in 1957 
promised federal aid (interstate highways are built with 90% federal funding 
and 10% state and local funding) for the highway improvements that would 
be needed to provide access. In short order, Interstate 10 was under construc­
tion from the Rigolets through the heart o f eastern New Orleans to the city’s 
downtown to the southwest. Second, Hurricane Betsy in 1965 (America’s first 
billion-dollar hurricane) revealed the highly hazardous nature o f the area cho­
sen for urban growth when it flooded the already developed Lower Ninth 
ward and most o f eastern New Orleans, which at that time was largely unde­
veloped. The Arm y Corps o f Engineers was ready with a solution to the 
problem with its plan for Lake Pontchartrain hurricane protection. The Lake 
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, authorized by Con­
gress in 1965 (see U.S. House 1965), directed the Corps to assume responsibil­
ity for building levees to protect the undeveloped eastern part o f Orleans 
Parish (79% o f the benefits that justified the project were to come from new 
development that would be made possible by the project) (U.S. G A O  1976). 
The Orleans Levee Board (a state agency) was to strengthen levees to protect 
older parts o f the city to avoid flooding by storms similar to Hurricane Betsy. 
The Corps assumed major responsibility for this as well, when the Lake Pont­
chartrain project was reformulated in the mid-1980s (U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers 1984). Third, in 1968 Congress enacted the National Flood Insur­
ance Act, which would provide federally subsidized insurance to cover flood 
risk to older development in the city and would cover, at actuarially sound 
rates, the residual risk o f flood damage to new homes protected by the new
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Corps levees and new drainage works constructed in the developing eastern 
part of the city by the city’s sewerage and water board.
The New Orleans City Planning Commission facilitated the urbaniza­
tion of the eastern part of the city with plans endorsing this site for urban 
expansion enacted in 1966 and 1970. W ith the planning commission’s blessing, 
Lewis notes,
By the 1970s suburban construction was already under way on a grand scale. . . . 
The largest was called “New Orleans East,” fifty square miles (32,000 acres) 
owned by a single corporation. . . . According to promotional literature, it will 
be a “totally planned community where 250,000 people will eventually live, 
work, and play.” (Lewis 2003, 76)
The bust in the oil industry in the 1980s deflated the New Orleans economy 
and quashed these dreams. Nevertheless, by the year 2000 some 22,000 new 
housing units had been built in the former swamps o f the eastern part o f the 
city, and the city planning commission wanted more. In its 1999 New Century 
New Orleans Land Use Plan, the city planning commission argued,
Moreover, there are extensive opportunities for future development of the vacant 
parcels that range from single vacant lots to multi-thousand acre tracts. Long 
term, these development opportunities represent not only population increases 
but also significant potential employment for the city. (City of New Orleans 
1999, 201)
Ironically, in the New Century plan the commission made absolutely no men­
tion of the extreme flood hazard facing the city, ways of mitigating the hazard 
through land use or building regulations, or how the city might recover from 
an event such as Hurricane Katrina. Equally ironically, just six years later, the 
entire area o f urban growth in the newly drained swamps of the eastern part 
of the city was under water.
In contrast to the recent urban development history of New Orleans, in 
Miami the past thirty-five years have seen a concerted effort by the State of 
Florida and the Miami-Dade County Government to limit urban develop­
ment in hazardous areas similar to eastern New Orleans. This was not always 
the case. In earlier years and with an economy based on tourism and land 
speculation, in 1906 the State of Florida embarked on an ambitious program 
to drain the Everglades. George (2006), notes,
Everglades reclamation (or drainage) led to the birth of a feverish real estate 
industry for Miami and much of southeast Florida as large speculators purchased 
millions of acres of reclaimed land from the State of Florida, then marketed it
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aggressively in many parts of the nation. The unsavory sales tactics of promoters 
who sold unwitting investors land that was underwater earned for Miami an 
enduring reputation for marketing “land by the gallon.”
The consequences for M iami of building on unsafe land, like those experi­
enced by New Orleans, were grave. The hurricane of 1926 left 373 killed, 811 
missing, and 40,000 homeless, and hurricanes in 1935, 1945, 1947, 1948, 1950, 
1964, and 1965 caused considerable damage.
With the advent o f the environmental movement in the 1960s and 
mounting population pressures on available resources, the state dramatically 
changed course. In 1972, the legislature enacted laws to protect the Everglades 
from exploitation and required the state government to develop a plan for 
sound future growth. In  1975, additional legislation was passed to require local 
governments to prepare comprehensive plans. This requirement was strength­
ened by the State and Regional Planning Act o f 1984 and the 1985 Omnibus 
Growth Management Act. These laws put in place a top to bottom planning 
system in which the state formulates broad policy objectives that are then 
implemented through multicounty regional plans and local government com­
prehensive plans. The state directed that the coastal management provisions 
o f local comprehensive plans must: (1) limit public expenditures that subsidize 
development in high-hazard areas unless the expenditures are related to the 
restoration or enhancement o f natural resources; (2) direct population concen­
trations away from known or predicted high-hazard areas; (3) maintain or 
reduce hurricane evacuation times; and (4) include post-disaster redevelop­
ment plans to reduce exposure o f human life and property to natural hazards 
(Burby et al. 1997, 52-65). In Dade County, in addition to complying with 
the state’s planning and resource protection requirements, the Miami-Dade 
County Government in 1975 adopted a regulatory urban growth boundary to 
concentrate future land development in core areas o f the county and to prevent 
further urban expansion into the wetlands in the western portions o f the 
county. This act stands in sharp contrast to the New Orleans city govern­
ment’s wholesale exploitation o f the flood-prone wetlands o f eastern New 
Orleans from the mid-1960s onward.
The benefits in terms o f reduced exposure to property losses in natural 
disasters o f Florida’s and Miami-Dade County’s proactive approach are strik­
ing. Our data on claims paid by property insurance companies for disaster 
losses between 1994 and 2000 indicate that they are much lower in Dade 
County ( $ 3 3  p e r  capita for residential claims; $6 per capita for commercial 
aims) than in Orleans Parish ($287 per capita for residential claims and $101 
oavm  ^ ^°r commerc^  claims). National Flood Insurance Program claims
revealino" £ ^  ^  twenty“^ve_year period between 1978 and 2002 are equally 
7 per capita in Dade County versus $708 per capita in Orleans
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Parish. In sum, this brief comparative case study o f two places with natural 
containment suggests that with adequate planning and attention to hazards, 
losses from natural hazards can be sharply curtailed. Without such planning, 
catastrophes o f the dimensions o f Hurricane Katrina can result.
C o n t a i n m e n t  a n d  D i s a s t e r  L o s s e s  N a t i o n w i d e
The experiences o f New Orleans and Miami-Dade County have been re­
peated in metropolitan counties across the U.S. In comparison to counties 
without containment programs, contained counties experienced greater total 
insured losses to residential property between January i, 1994 and December 
31, 2000 (an average o f S37.3 million per county for contained counties versus 
$30.7 million for uncontained counties) and greater losses per housing unit 
($293 versus $291). Although they are in the direction predicted, none o f these 
differences are statistically significant. This anomaly, however, is due to the 
effect of state planning and hazard mitigation mandates that limit the impact 
o f containment on losses in a portion o f the counties with containment pro­
grams.
Commercial losses present a similar picture. Average losses to commer­
cial property are higher in counties with containment ($9 million versus $7.8 
million), but losses per capita are somewhat lower in contained counties ($24 
versus $31). Again the differences are not statistically significant.
State hazard mitigation mandates have a strong effect in reducing in­
sured losses, as shown in Table 2. Average losses per county over the study 
period were $40 million in states that do not require attention to hazards in 
local comprehensive plans but only $16 million per county in states with haz­
ard mitigation mandates. Average losses per housing unit were also more than 
twice as high in states without hazard mitigation mandates. Commercial 
losses present a similar picture.
The combined effects o f containment and state planning mandates are 
shown in Table 3, which is constructed to mirror the table o f hypothesized 
effects presented earlier. In the top panel for residential losses and bottom 
panel for commercial losses, we see that, as predicted, losses are highest in 
jurisdictions that have enacted containment programs and are located in states 
that do not require attention to hazards in local planning programs. Contrary 
to our expectations, losses are lowest in counties with containment programs 
in states that require attention to hazard mitigation in local planning. The 
differences between the two groups o f contained counties are striking.
Average per county residential losses per housing unit are $491 in con­
tained counties without state hazard mitigation mandates versus only $95 in 
contained counties with a mandate. Differences in commercial losses are 
equally striking, with average losses per capita o f $41 in contained counties
T a b le  2 . State Hazard Mitigation Mandates and Insured Losses (2000 dollars) 
to Residential and Commercial Property in Natural Disasters, January 1, 1994-  
December 31, 2000“













Counties in states Mean: Mean: $360 Mean: Mean: 832
that do not mandate 840,288,000 M edian 176 89,531,000 Median: 11
local hazard Median: Median:
mitigation (« =  115) 9,700,000 2,115,000
Counties in states Mean: Mean: $118*“ Mean: Mean: $18*
that do mandate 516,180,000** Median: 87 $5,116,000* Median: 4
local hazard Median: Median:
mitigation (« =  45) 8,475,000 895,000
* p =  .10 ** p =  .05 *** p =  .01 (one tailed, difference o f means test)
“Sample consists o f metropolitan counties with containment programs established 1990 and 
earlier and a random comparison sample of metropolitan counties without containment 
programs. Counties that did not experience losses in a natural disaster between January 1, 
1994 and December 31, 2000  are not included in the analysis. 
bCalculated by dividing total insured losses by the total number o f housing units in a county. 
Since all housing units are included rather than just those that carried insurance for prop­
erty losses, the losses per insured housing unit shown are smaller than those per housing 
unit carrying insurance (i.e., insurance companies experience higher losses per insured 
household than shown here).
not subject to state hazard mitigation mandates versus $7 in contained coun­
ties with state mandates.
Comparing counties across state hazard mitigation mandates (rows) also 
illustrates the importance o f state hazard mitigation mandates. Average losses 
in contained counties in states without hazard mitigation mandates are $491 
per housing unit versus average losses o f $306 per housing unit in counties 
without containment. Where the states mandate attention to hazards the pic­
ture is reversed. Contained counties actually have lower losses per housing 
unit than those without containment, providing strong vindication for the 
containment and hazard mitigation policies pursued by states such as Florida, 
Maryland, and Oregon that vigorously champion both containment and haz­
ard mitigation in state planning policy.
Our findings for natural containment mirror those for containment pol­
icy) except that both states with and without state hazard mitigation mandates 
shr ed k°unt*es exPerienced higher losses than uncontained counties. As 
losses er h 4, in states with hazard mitigation mandates,
average dee ^  Umt ^  considerably higher in counties with an above
average degree o f  W  ^  C° UntieS w ith a . beloW
• n counties subject to state hazard mitigation
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T a b l e  3. Joint Effects of Urban Containment programs and State Hazard 
Mitigation Planning Mandates on Insured Losses (2000 dollars) to Residential and 
Commercial Property in Natural Disasters, January 1, 1994-December 31, 2000“
a. Residential property losses per housing unit (average for sample: $292)
Local hazard mitigation Mean losses per housing unitb by containment o f  urban growth*
mandated by state
Containment program exists Containment does not exist
No S491 (n = 34) $306 (n =  81)
Yes $95 (n = 34) $190 (n = 11)
*p =  .001 (one tailed, difference of means test; p =  .000 for square root transformation to 
adjust for skewed distribution o f losses)
“Sample consists o f metropolitan counties with containment programs established 1990 and 
earlier and a random comparison sample o f metropolitan counties without containment 
programs. Counties that did not experience losses in a natural disaster between January 1 , 
1994 and December 31, 2000 are not included in the analysis. 
bCalculated by dividing total insured losses by the total number of housing units in a county. 
Since all housing units are included rather than just those that carried insurance for prop­
erty losses, the losses per insured housing unit shown are smaller than those per housing 
unit carrying insurance (insurance companies experience higher losses per insured house­
hold than shown here).
b. Commercial property losses per capita (average for sample $28)
Local hazard mitigation Mean losses by containment o f  urban growth*
mandated by state
Containment exists Containment does not exist
No $41 (n =  34 ) $28 (n =  81)
Yes $ 7 (n =  34) $52 (n =  11)
*p = .03 (one tailed, difference o f means test; p =  .003 for square root transformation to 
adjust for skewed distribution of losses)
“Sample consists o f metropolitan counties with containment programs established 1990 and 
earlier and a random comparison sample of metropolitan counties without containment 
programs. Counties that did not experience losses in a natural disaster between January 1 , 
1994 and December 31, 2000 are not included in the analysis.
mandates, losses are 40% higher in the counties with a higher degree of natu­
ral containment. The results for losses to commercial property shown in the 
bottom panel of Table 4 are similar, with losses per capita notably higher in 
counties with a high degree of natural containment. As with residential losses, 
counties in states with hazard mitigation mandates suffered much lower com­
mercial losses per capita, in both areas with a high degree of natural contain­
ment and also areas with a low degree of natural containment.
To this point, our analyses do not control for other factors that can affect 
the magnitude of losses in natural disasters. Multiple OLS regression provides 
a way to isolate the effects of public policies such as containment and state
R.  J .  B U R B Y ,  A .  C.  N E L S O N ,  A N D  T.  W.  S A N C H E Z
T a b l e  4 . Joint Effects of Natural Containment of Urban Growth and State 
Hazard Mitigation Planning Mandates on Insured Losses (2000 Dollars) to 
Residential and Commercial Property in Natural Disasters, January 1, 1994-December 
31, 2000a
a. Residential property losses per housing unit (average for sample: $293)
Local hazard mitigation Mean losses per housing unit*1 by containment o f  urban growth*
mandated by state
H igh natural containment1 Low natural containment*
No $479 (n =  42) . $278 {n = 64)
Yes $123 (n =  31) $88 (n =  8)
*p =  .001 (one tailed, difference of means test; p =  .000 for square root transformation to 
adjust for skewed distribution o f losses)
“Sample consists o f metropolitan counties with containment programs established 1990 and 
earlier and a random comparison sample of metropolitan counties without containment 
programs. Counties that did not experience losses in a natural disaster between January 1 , 
1994, and December 31, 2000 , are not included in the analysis. 
bCalculated by dividing total insured losses by the total number of housing units in a county. 
Since all housing units are included rather than just those that carried insurance for prop­
erty losses, the losses per insured housing unit shown are smaller than those per housing 
unit carrying insurance (i.e., insurance companies experience higher losses per insured 
household than shown here). 
cLow natural containment includes counties with natural containment below the median level 
for the sample; high natural containment includes counties with natural containment at 
or above the median level for the sample.
b. Commercial property losses per capita (average for sample $28)
Local hazard mitigation Mean losses by containment o f urban growth*
mandated by state " \ " " " i
High natural containm ent Low natural containment^
No $51 (n =  42) S19 (n =  64)
Yes $22 (n =  31) $6 (n =  8)
*p =  .03 (one tailed, difference of means test; p =  .003 for square root transformation to 
adjust for skewed distribution o f losses)
“Sample consists o f metropolitan counties with containment programs established 1990 and 
earlier and a random comparison sample of metropolitan counties without containment 
programs. Counties that did not experience losses in a natural disaster between January 1 , 
1994 and December 31, 2000 are not included in the analysis. 
bLow natural containment includes counties with natural containment below the median level 
for the sample; high natural containment includes counties with natural containment at 
or above the median level for the sample.
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T a b l e  5 . Multivariate Analysis of Urban Containment and Insured Losses (2000 
Dollars) to Residential and Commercial Property in Natural Disasters, U.S. Counties, 
January 1, 1994-December 31, 2000
Variable Standardized regression coefficients
Losses to residential 
property"
Losses to commercial 
property1
Containment
Containment program adopted .07 .03
1990 or earlier
Degree o f natural containment .15** .24***
State planning policy
State mandated local -.1 4 * - .0 8
comprehensive planning
State mandated hazard element -.19** -  .20***
in plans
Socioeconomic factors
Median household income, .10* - .0 8
1992
Total number o f housing .51***
units, 1990
Value of manufacturing 25“
shipments, 1992
Number o f retail .23“
establishments, 1992
Model statistics
Adjusted R 2 .33 .28
-F-value 12.94 10.41
Significance .000 .000
Number of cases 145 145
* p =  .10 “ p =  .05 “ *p =  .01 (one-tailed test)
‘Total losses with square root transformation to adjust for skewed distributions.
planning mandates while simultaneously taking into account other factors that 
can affect losses in disasters. The results o f these analyses are summarized in 
Table 5, which shows that containment programs do not have a statistically 
significant effect on losses, while state planning mandates have negative and 
statistically significant effects. These findings parallel the results reported 
above. That is, containment policy has a very moderate effect in magnifying 
losses while state hazard mitigation mandates reduce losses.
The regression results show that natural containment has a much
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stronger (and statistically significant) effect in increasing losses in disasters 
than legislated containment policy. This is not unexpected, for two reasons. 
First, we would expect that places with high degrees of natural containment 
(versus high degrees of policy containment) to face higher risks of loss when 
containment is caused by hazardous conditions, such as lake or ocean shore­
lines susceptible to hurricane-driven storm surges or steep mountain slopes 
susceptible to landslides. Second, natural containment by wetlands, rivers, 
lakes, ocean shoreline, and mountains has been present, where it exists, since 
urbanization began in naturally contained counties. In contrast and as noted 
earlier, legislated containment programs are for the most part of relatively 
recent origin. Over a longer period o f time, we would expect to see stronger 
effects of containment, although probably not as strong as those found for 
natural containment.
The effects of the other control variables are what we would expect. 
Counties with more housing units and wealthier people experience more 
losses to residential property than counties‘ with fewer housing units and 
poorer people. The reasons may be that wealthier people are better able to 
afford and purchase insurance, more likely to live in more expensive housing, 
and possibly more likely to choose housing locations near hazardous areas to 
gain exclusive enjoyment of views, privacy, and related amenities. In the case 
of losses to commercial property, variables representing the magnitude of re­
tail and manufacturing property at risk are associated with losses, while house­
hold income has little effect.
S o m e  P o l i c y  I m p l i c a t i o n s
W hen the path of urban expansion is blocked by natural features or legisla­
tively by growth boundaries put in place to combat urban sprawl, pressures to 
develop land exposed to natural hazards can increase. This inevitably leads to 
higher property damages in natural disasters than would have otherwise oc­
curred. Our findings indicate that the tendency for urban containment to 
increase vulnerability to natural disasters can be limited (and even reversed) if 
states enact policies that require local governments to prepare comprehensive 
plans and attend to hazard mitigation in these plans and in related growth 
management efforts. Thus, cities such as New Orleans that have limited op­
portunities for urban expansion outside of hazardous areas and cities with 
smart growth programs designed to control urban sprawl need not suffer ex­
traordinary property losses in disasters. Smart, safe growth is possible, but 
only if states simultaneously adopt policies to combat sprawl and reduce vul­
nerability to losses from natural hazards. States such as Florida, Maryland, 
and Oregon have been path breakers in this regard and can serve as models
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for other states that want to be proactive in dealing with urban sprawl and 
natural hazards.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the federal government paid little attention 
to requirements for attention to natural hazards in local government compre­
hensive plans. Its hazard mitigation efforts focus primarily on measures to 
facilitate development in hazardous areas (such as building elevation require­
ments o f the National Flood Insurance Program and flood control programs 
of the Corps o f Engineers) and measures to reduce the adverse consequences 
to households and businesses when this development is destroyed in disasters 
(such as flood insurance, disaster relief, and subsidized loans and tax deduc­
tions for reconstruction). Incentives for local government hazard mitigation 
planning are limited and focus narrowly on hazard mitigation, primarily to 
unwise developments at risk, rather than on planning for and managing the 
location, as well as the character, o f urban development and redevelopment.
At the time o f this writing, however, legislation is pending in Congress 
to help local governments plan effectively for land exposed to various hazards. 
The Safe Communities Act o f 2005 (H R  3524) was introduced in the House 
o f Representatives on July 28, 2005, just a month before Hurricane Katrina 
struck the G u lf Coast. The safe communities bill authorizes grants o f up to 
$1.25 million per jurisdiction to help states update their comprehensive plan­
ning statutes and to help localities to assess their vulnerability to hazards, 
prepare comprehensive plans, integrate hazards considerations into compre­
hensive plans and transportation plans, and to update building codes and zon­
ing and other land use regulations so that they give adequate attention to 
hazard mitigation. I f  passed, this legislation should go far in realizing the 
promise o f comprehensive plans to counter the potential for natural contain­
ment and smart growth containment policies to exacerbate exposure to losses 
in disasters.
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Notes
1. There are many other examples. The 1978 comprehensive plan for Boulder, 
Colorado, also implemented a three-tiered, phased development system, in this case 
reinforced by a publicly owned greenbelt (Freilich 1999). Based on state enabling 
legislation enacted in 1976, Minneapolis-St. Paul established a regional urban service 
boundary in 1980 (Orfield 1997). Since 1980, urban containment policies have been 
encouraged or mandated by the states of Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, and Wash­
ington (Weitz 1999), and have been adopted by cities in over 100 metropolitan regions 
(Nelson and Dawkins 2004).
2. Our research design uses OLS regression analysis to control for other factors 
that can affect the magnitude of losses from natural disasters. These factors include 
the size of the building stock that could be damaged and a measure of income as a 
proxy for the value of the building stock. Data to measure the magnitude of the 
housing stock, number of retail establishments, industrial activity, and median house­
hold income come from USA Counties 1998, a publication of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce Economics and Statistics Administration, U.S. Census Bureau.
Before proceeding to the research findings, several limitations of the data should 
be noted. First, our data on losses in disasters are very narrow, since they are limited 
to claims payments for damage to buildings. They do not include uninsured property 
losses, losses to public infrastructure, losses from business interruptions, and losses to 
residential property from flooding or earthquakes. We assume that our insured loss 
data reflect other types of losses, but we do not have data to verify that assumption. 
Second, we found it impossible to measure and control for the severity of the hazards 
experienced by the samples of counties with varying degrees of containment, since 
records on rainfall and other hazards are not available for every county in the United 
States. We do not view this as a serious limitation, because in a companion study to 
this in which we looked at coastal flood losses and controlled for the frequency of 
flood events, we found that the effects of state planning requirements were similar to 
those we report here (see Burby 2006). Third, although every effort to be exhaustive 
has been made in identifying places with urban containment programs, there is some 
possibility that some containment programs have been missed so that the sample of 
places without containment may have a few places that, in fact, have containment 
programs of one sort or another. Also, the containment programs studied vary consid­
erably in stringency, which should affect their impacts on land markets and develop­
ment pressures in hazardous areas. For example, the programs vary in the amount of 
land included within growth boundaries, but it was beyond the resources available for 
this study to physically measure the detailed characteristics of each program. Finally, 
half the containment programs we studied were adopted between 1980 and 1990, so 
that not much time had elapsed for them to affect development patterns that could 
have contributed to losses experienced in disasters between 1994 and 2000. The vari­
ous limitations of our containment data make it more difficult to detect the effects of 
containment programs on exposure to hazards and losses in natural disasters. Thus,
to the extent we find such effects, readers can have some confidence that the effects 
are real; to the extent we do not find effects, however, one explanation (in addition 
to a real lack of effect) could be the crude nature of our measures and the need for 
more time for the effects of containment to manifest themselves.
3. Notable hurricanes causing catastrophic losses in New Orleans include storms 
in 1915 (25,000 buildings flooded), 1947, 1965 (Hurricane Betsy), 1969 (Hurricane 
Camille), 1995 (unnamed rainstorm flooded 20,000 homes), and 2005 (Hurricane Ka­
trina); severe hurricanes striking Miami include the storms of 1926 (which killed 373 
and literally destroyed the entire city), 1981 (tropical storm Dennis flooded the entire 
area), 1992 (Hurricane Andrew), 1999 (Hurricane Irene), and 2005 (Hurricanes Ka­
trina and Wilma) (data from Hurricane City 2006a, b).
T H E  P R O B L E M S  O F  C O N T A I N M E N T
